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ODEGAARD VS. CRAIG*: A COMMENT
ROBERT E. BECK**
In 1965 this author wrote: "Hopefully in future cases on boun-
dary problems the North Dakota Supreme Court will focus on the
need for assisting in the practical location of boundaries."1 The
December, 1966, decision in Trautman v. Ahlert2 dealt a severe
blow to this hope; and the September, 1969, decision in Odegaard v.
Craig,s has pretty much eliminated it. Not only did the court in
Trautman and Odegaard not focus on such a need, but it seemed by
implication to reject the notion. Odegaard will be the focal point
of this comment as it is the most recent.
Odegaard dealt with adverse possession at the trial level, and
apparently counsel raised the question of "acquiescence" for the
first time on appeal. Acquiescence is an important doctrine relating
to the practical location of boundaries. In handling that proffer the
court in its entire discussion of acquiescence said only:
The issue of establishment of the boundary line between the
northeast quarter and the southeast quarter by acquiescence
of the parties was not raised or considered in the trial court.
It cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. This rule is
elementary.
Remmick v. Mills, 165 N.W.2d 61 (N. D. 1969).
If it may be argued that the issues of acquiescence and ad-
verse possession are so nearly identical that the considera-
tion of either issue in the lower court should permit the other
to be raised on appeal, it is our opinion that nothing short
of acquiescence for the statutory period required for acquisi-
* 171 N.W.2d 133 (N.D. 1969).
** Professor of Law, University of North Dakota School of Law; LLB. University of
Minnesota; LL.M. New York University.
1. Beck, Boundary Litigation and Legislation in North Dakota, 41 N.D. L. REv. 424,
470 (19651). The classic article on the subject still is Browder, The Practical Location of
Boundaries, 56 MxcH. . REv. 487 (1958). "The term 'practical location' is used in this dis-
cussion as a generic term to refer to the several rules, other than adverse possession,
which have been announced for the determination of boundaries on the ground." Id. at
489-90.
2. 147 N.W.2d 407 (N.D. 1966). See the discussion infra at note 20.
3. 171 N.W.2d 133 (N.D. 1969).
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tion of title by adverse possession will establish a boundary
line by acquiescence.
Bichler v. Ternes, 63 N.D. 295, 248 N.W. 185.
Bernier v. Preckel, 60 N.D. 549, 236 N.W. 243.4
The first paragraph of the court's response appears to be justified
by previous authority, particularly since acquiescence needs factual
data to support its existence, and a defendant should have the
opportunity to offer evidence addressed to that issue.5 It is the
second paragraph that presents great difficulties.
In a 1965 article, this author discussed the confused status of
the North Dakota law on acquiescence and the need for clarifica-
tion.6 Now, at first glance, the statement in Odegaard does appear to
clarify at least the question of the time period needed for acquies-
cence. The court says it is to be ". . . the statutory period required for
acquisition of title by adverse possession. . . ."I But which adverse
possession statutory period? North Dakota has two, one for 10
years8 and one for 20 years.9 Probably a stronger case can be
made for the 20 year statute. It is the only one mentioned in Ode-
gaard,10 in Bernier," and in Trautman.12 Neither statute is re-
ferred to in Bichler.13 Then too, payment of taxes which must ac-
company the 10 year statutory claim 14 seems more applicable to
adverse possession of an entire tract than to a disputed area be-
tween two tracts. But the fact remains that North Dakota has two sta-
tory adverse possession periods.
And certainly the introductory "if it may be argued that"
phraseology to this one-sentence paragraph does nothing to clarify
the law. While many jurisdictions consider the basis for acquiescence
to be prescription rather than a form of practical location of
boundaries, the difference between adverse possession and acqui-
escence seems to be suggested by the very terms themselves.
'Adverse' possession suggests an element of hostility. 'Ac-
4. Id. at 137.
5. See Remmick v. Mills, 165 N.W.2d 61, 68 (N.D. 1968).
6. Beck, supra note 1, at 463-70.
7. 171 N.W.2d at 137.
8. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-06-03 (1960).
9. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-04 (1960).
10. 171 N.W.2d 133 (N.D. 1969).
11. 60 N.D. 549, 236 N.W. 243 (1931).
12. 147 N.W.2d 407 (N.D. 1966).
13. 63 N.D. 295, 248 N.W. 185 (1933).
14. A titlei to real property, vested in any person who has been or hereafter
shall be, either alone or including those under whom he cjaims, in the actual
openl adverse and undisputed possession of the land under such title for a
period of ten yeans and i;ho, either alone or including those under whom he
claims, shall have paid all taxes and assessments legally levied thereon, shall
be valid in law. Possession by a county under tax deed shall not be; deemed
adverse. A contract for deed shall constitute color of title within the mean-
ing of this section from and after the execution of such contract.
N.D. CENT. CoDid § 47-06-03 (1960) (Emphasis added).
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quiescence' suggests an element of consent. When one whose
land is being claimed under adverse possession says to the
claimant, 'You are wrongfully occupying my land', he may be
assisting the claimant, for the statement helps show the 'hos-
tile' element. On the other hand, such a statement may well
defeat a claimant who is relying on acquiescence, for it ne-
gates consent.15
One would have hoped that with the unclear state of the North Da-
kota law on the subject, the court in any new pronouncement would
have explored the underlying policy and rationale of the general
concept before it proceeded to attempt settling even any portion of
the law (here the time period required) on that subject.
The court in Odegaard did cite two North Dakota cases8 in
support of its adverse possession time period decision. Neither of
these cases, nor both together, require a conclusion that the period
for acquiescence is that of adverse possession.7 In one, the court
stated that "[t] he evidence shows that the original grantor claimed
the grantee had fenced in too much land."',, This alone may have
been sufficient to negate the implication of consent necessary for
the doctrine of acquiescence to apply and thus have served as the
basis for the decision. In the other, the period involved appears to
have been in excess of thirty years. 19 For the court there to have
said that 20 were required would have been dictum. And anyway,
it is not clear that the court said that 20 were required. Nor
does the 1966 Trautman case,'0 which the court did not bother to
cite in Odegaard, require that conclusion, for it can be explained on
a strict adverse possession basis. Perhaps it was not cited because
the court recognized that it did not require this conclusion. Or per-
15. Beck, supra note 1, at 466.
16. Bichler v. Ternes, 63 N.D. 296, 248 N.W. 185 (1933) ; Bernier v. Preckel, 60 N.D.
549, 236 N.W. 243 (1931).
17. See genera y, the discussion of these two cases in Beck, supra note 1, at 467-70.
That discussion will not be repeated here.
18. Bichler, v. Ternes, 63 N.D. 295, 248 N.W. 185, 190 (1933).
19. Bernier v. Preckel, 60 N.D. 549, 236 N.W. 243 (1931).
20. 147 N.W.2d 407 (N.D, 1966). In Trautman two boundary lines were at issue; the
court stated in support of its decision in favor of the defendant on one boundary that
during all of this period of time defendant had been in possession
which was hostile and under a claim of right actual, open, notorious exclu-
sive, continuous, and uninterrupted.
Id. at 412. This is certainly traditional adverse possession language and could have ex-
plained thel decision on a straightforward adverse possession basis. But the Court con-
tinued:
Aqquiescence in a boundary line is binding on the parties thereto and
those claiming under them, and where successive adverse occupants hold in
prIvity with each other under the same claim of title, the time limit for
maintaining an action may be computed by the last occupants from the date
the cause of action accrued against the first adverse user.
We are of the opinion that the boundary line between the Southeast
Quarter of Section 9 and the Southwest Quarter of Section 9 was established
by acquiescence of the parties and their predecessors and grantors.
Id.. For each paragraph the Court cited Bernier.
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haps the court did not review all of the material available in North
Dakota on North Dakota acquiescence law; and one begins to wonder
what good it does to analyze the law, to present clouded issues, and
to urge clarification by way of law review articles, for example, if
it falls on deaf ears or no ears at all.
In recent years the court has given us many good examples
of how to approach unclear but important issues. These include Perry
v. Erling,21 in which the court explored some of the policy underlying
doctrines related to accretion. More recently, in Lembke v. Unke,22
the court went so far as to overturn an early North Dakota Su-
preme Court decision on the doctor-patient privilege after a thorough
analysis of the policy involved. And see In re Estate of Jensen,23
where the court found unconstitutional that section of the North Da-
kota Century Code that treated illegitimate children different from
legitimate children. These cases demonstrate sound judicial prac-
tices, and it is unfortunate that the same practices were not fol-
lowed in Odegaard on another important topic. Perhaps the lapse in
Odegaard is so much more noticeable because of the quality we
have become used to through cases such as Perry, Lembke, and
Jensen.
The case series of Bernier, Bichler, Trautman and Odegaard
represent a good example of bad decision making. The sum and
substance of the nonanalysis process involved in these cases seems
to be that North Dakota is committed to a doctrine of acquiescence
based on a theory of analogy to adverse possession. This may well
have rendered relatively ineffective an otherwise powerful weapon
in the practical location of boundaries arsenal.
21. 132 N.W.2d 889 (N.D. 1965). While the ultimate rationale adopted may be ques-
tioned, see Beck, supra note 1, at 446-50, the analytical approach of the Court is com-
mendable.
22. Lembke v. Unke, 171 N.W.2d 837 (N.D. 1969), two justices dissenting.
23. 162 N.W.2d 861 (N.D. 1968), discussed in Heckman, The Treatment of Some Tra-
ditional Problems of Intestate SuccesOon in the North Dakota Century Code, 45 N.D. L.
REv. 465, 475-78 (1969).
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